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ABSTRACT
Perez, Carlos R. M.S.E.C.E., Purdue University, December, 2007. Reputation-based
Resilient Data Aggregation in Sensor Network . Major Professor: Saurabh Bagchi.
Data aggregation, or the fusing of many sensor measurements into a single sum-
mary, has been proposed as an important primitive in wireless sensor networks. But
data aggregation is vulnerable to security attacks and natural failures where a few
nodes can drastically alter the result of the aggregation by reporting erroneous data.
In this thesis we present RDAS, a robust data aggregation protocol that uses a
reputation-based approach to identify and isolate malicious nodes in a sensor net-
work. RDAS is based on a hierarchical clustering arrangement of nodes, where a
cluster head analyzes data from the cluster nodes to determine the location of an
event. It uses the redundancy of the data along with certain assumptions about the
sensors and environment to determine what data should have been reported by each
node. Nodes form part of a reputation system, where they share information about
other node’s performance in reporting accurate data and use the reputation ratings
to mitigate the effect of malicious nodes in the data aggregation. Our system is able
to perform accurate data aggregation in the presence of individually malicious and
colluding nodes. It also deals with attacks where nodes try to compromise the rep-
utation system by reporting false accusation and false praise for other nodes. The
system a separate metric called trust that captures the fidelity of a node in reporting
on other nodes’ behavior. We present simulation results to show that the aggregation




Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) hold the promise of enabling pervasive com-
puting by providing nodes and networks capable of interacting with the physical
environment and wirelessly communicating with the wireline computing infrastruc-
ture. Many WSNs are used for detecting events occurring in the physical environment
and then pinpointing the location of the event by correlating information from mul-
tiple sensor nodes that have sensed the event. As WSNs start to be used for critical
applications, security of the network becomes a prominent concern. Securing network
communications has traditionally been achieved through cryptographic mechanisms,
but these are by themselves insufficient to protect WSNs. Sensor nodes are deployed
for long periods of autonomous operation, often in unmonitored places. This makes it
possible for an adversary to physically take control of a node. Once this is achieved,
all the cryptographic keys available on the node are available to the adversary and
therefore the node can continue to pretend to be a legitimate node while performing
malicious actions.
The security community for WSNs has therefore developed a suite of mechanisms
to complement cryptographic techniques. These have broadly comprised of develop-
ments in the area of behavior based detection of malicious behavior by a node [1] [2].
Any security mechanism also has to fit within the resource constraints posed by
the devices, most significantly, the energy, bandwidth, memory, and computational
power. The first two constraints dictate that the network security mechanism should
not generate much excess traffic for providing the security guarantees.
Several researchers have recently proposed the use of reputation systems as a
method for behavior based identification of malicious nodes in WSNs. A reputation
system in the WSN context is a system where the actions of every node are observed
and evaluated by the other nodes in an attempt to determine their trustworthiness.
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The interaction a node has with another node is guided by the state (the reputation)
that the node has built up about the interacting partner node. The reputation systems
for WSNs are all distributed in nature since it is unrealistic to assume the existence of
a single privileged node that is able to observe every other node and is the trustworthy
repository of a global reputation information.
WSNs are broadly used for the purpose of data collection from the physical world.
The traditional architecture is to employ a data aggregator which performs aggrega-
tion operations on individual data collected by the sensors embedded in the sensing
field. The aggregation operations could include summarization over time, computing
averages across different nodes, changing the resolution of the data, etc. Data ag-
gregation is widely favored due to the significant energy savings that result from it
compared to a flat network with each sensing node communicating with the base sta-
tion. However, data aggregation is widely regarded as being sensitive to attacks and
failures [3]. If a node, a set of nodes, or worse still, a set of colluding nodes, lies about
the sensed data, it can significantly shift the outcome of data fusion, triggering false
events, hiding true events or reducing the accuracy of the location of the sensed event.
Since the base station receives an aggregation instead of the raw data it loses the abil-
ity to filter out erroneous reports. The typical attack model assumes the aggregators
are vulnerable to security attacks. Thus, another vulnerability of data aggregation is
that the aggregator becomes a single point of failure and if compromised can easily
generate false data or omit sending data to the base station.
The above observations provide the motivation for building a robust data aggre-
gation system for WSNs capable of tolerating unreliable and malicious nodes. In this
paper we present the design of a protocol called RDAS that develops a distributed
reputation system for the data aggregation problem.
There exist several challenges in the effort. First, a malicious node that partici-
pates in the reputation system can degrade its fidelity by lying. A compromised node
can falsely accuse well-behaving nodes of malicious actions or falsely praise misbehav-
ing nodes. To maintain its integrity the reputation system must be able to prevent
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these kinds of attacks. Second, the reputation system has to discriminate between
legitimate nodes having occasional natural errors and malicious actions. This is im-
possible to do on an individual action but needs to be achieved over the long run.
Third, the distributed views of all the nodes must be reconciled to achieve aggregate
goals of the network, such as, electing a cluster head, getting the individual sensed
values from the nodes aggregated into one cohesive value, etc.
To meet the challenges, we have to extend existing reputation systems in two fun-
damental ways—first, consider different functionalities of the different nodes (such
as, sensing, aggregation) in establishing their reputation values and second, com-
pensate for the errors in observation of another node’s actions in building up the
reputation. Next, we have to develop a mechanism to use the distributed reputation
scores being maintained at the different nodes. In our solution, this takes the form of
periodically electing reputable cluster heads as aggregators, using the reputation of
individual node’s reputation values at the cluster heads for the aggregation operation,
and providing shadow cluster heads to observe potential misbehavior of the cluster
head. Thus, RDAS can work under the possibility of any node in the network be-
ing compromised, including the current cluster head. We achieve the goals in RDAS
while maintaining a low resource consumption in terms of network messages, runtime
memory, and computation.
To demonstrate the capabilities of RDAS, we use it to solve the problem of event
detection and localization in a sensor network arranged in clusters. This is an oft-
seen problem in sensor networks which is solved with data aggregation since data from
multiple nodes is required to correctly locate an event, e.g., through error resilient
triangulation [4]. We implement RDAS in an embedded programming environment
called TinyOS for Berkeley mote class of devices and run the implementation through
a simulator called TOSSIM. For the fault model, we consider three categories of faulty
nodes: a) nodes that report randomly chosen false data; b) nodes that collude to
report similar false data; c) lying nodes which participate in false accusation and
false praise attacks. We evaluate how the accuracy of the event location is affected as
4
the percentage of different types of faulty nodes is gradually increased at various rates
of compromise. The use of an insecure data aggregation that does not use reputation
(LEACH in our experiments) serves as the baseline. The high level metric for the
comparison is the accuracy in localization of an event detected in the network.
1.1 Reputation-based Data Aggregation Problem
A prevailing approach to reduce data streams and power consumption in WSN
is the aggregation or fusion of data before transmittal to the base station. To per-
form data aggregation nodes communicate with each other and form clusters. Nodes
within a cluster share their sensed data, which is fused together by a cluster head
and this aggregation is sent in a single data stream to the base station. This data
aggregation process provides substantial energy savings in the WSN. Previous works
have achieved energy savings of up to 800% [5] using distributed data aggregation
schemes. Although such energy savings are desirable, data aggregation is sensitive
to attacks and failures. If a node lies about its sensed data it can significantly shift
the outcome of data fusion, triggering false events, hiding true events or reducing
the accuracy of the location of the sensed event. Since the base station receives an
aggregation instead of the raw data it loses the ability of filter out erroneous reports
and we argue that the appropriate point for such filtration is the cluster head. An-
other vulnerability of data aggregation is that the node performing the aggregation
becomes a single point of failure and if compromised can easily generate false data or
omit sending data to the base station.
Reputation systems have been proposed as an attractive complement to cryptog-
raphy in securing WSNs for several reasons. In the operational paradigm of WSNs
sensor nodes are meant to be used in remote and unsupervised locations where intrud-
ers can physically access nodes and extract cryptographic keys. Once cryptographic
keys have been obtained by the adversary, the node cannot be distinguished from a
legitimate node using cryptographic operations alone. Reputation systems provide
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the ability to detect and isolate both faulty and malicious nodes that are behaving
inappropriately in the context of the specific WSN.
Building a robust reputation system presents several important challenges on its
own. The most pressing is the possibility that a malicious node that participates in the
reputation system can prevent it from functioning by lying. A compromised node can
falsely accuse well-behaving nodes of malicious actions or falsely praise bad-behaving
nodes. To maintain its integrity the reputation system must be able to prevent these
kinds of attacks. Another important issue when building reputation is determining
when a node has performed a malicious action and being able to distinguish it from
natural failures. Due to the uncertain nature of WSN environment, such as collisions
on the wireless channel, it is not always possible to distinguish these two kinds of
erroneous behavior. In this thesis we tackle these challenges and tradeoffs as applied
to data aggregation for event localization in a static WSN.
The goal of the proposed RDAS protocol is to reduce the amount of error in data
aggregation in the presence of faulty nodes. Each node senses and reports on the
location of an event that occurs within the sensing range of the node. The approach
followed by RDAS is to use the data aggregated from multiple nodes to measure the
performance of individual nodes in reporting sensor data and generate a reputation
rating about each node. Importantly, there is no centralized computation or storage
of the reputation ratings; instead, each node maintains a reputation rating for each
other node that it interacts with. This reputation rating is then used to suppress the
contribution of faulty nodes in the final aggregated data. To accelerate the building
of reputation over time, nodes share their observations about other nodes with the
rest of the network. This lends the system open to the false praise or the false accu-
sation attack by malicious nodes, as has been discussed in prior work [6] [7]. In order
to guard against such attacks, RDAS incorporates the concept of trust, which mea-
sures a node’s performance in reporting about other nodes. Trust is generated over
time by comparing reputation reports with the current reputation ratings. Finally,
RDAS incorporates a redundant aggregation and monitoring mechanism to prevent
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nodes performing data aggregation duties from sabotaging the results sent to the base
station.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of RDAS, we used the protocol to solve the spe-
cific problem of event detection and localization in sensor networks. This is a typical
problem in sensor networks which is suitable to be solved with data aggregation since
data from multiple nodes is required to correctly locate an event, e.g., through error
resilient triangulation [4]. We use a TOSSIM [8] simulation to demonstrate how the
accuracy of cluster-based event localization is improved by using RDAS in the pres-
ence of different types of faulty nodes. We group faulty nodes into three categories:
a) nodes that report randomly chosen false data; b) nodes that collude to report
similar false data; c) lying nodes which participate in false accusation and false praise
attacks. We evaluate how the accuracy of the event location is affected as the percent-
age of different types of faulty nodes is gradually increased at various rates. Three
experiments are discussed where network operation is observed as we: 1) gradually
introduce nodes that report false data, 2) gradually introduce nodes that report false
data and false reputation reports and 3) gradually introduce nodes up to a fixed per-
centage of the network is compromised. For all experiments we measure the accuracy
of event localization and the change in reputation and trust of compromised and non-
compromised nodes. Results indicate that RDAS invariably improves the accuracy
of data aggregation over the baseline case of not using reputation in the presence
of non-colluding faulty nodes and with up to 60% of the network compromised with
colluding faulty nodes. Insight is provided into how the use of reputation and trust
ratings helps neutralize over time the influence of faulty nodes in data aggregation.
The main contributions of this thesis are the following:
1. RDAS effectively uses a reputation system to add resiliency to the common
problem of event localization, and provides concrete answers to the questions of how
to effectively generate, propagate and use reputation ratings.
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2. It maintains the accuracy of data aggregation in the presence of both collabo-
rating and non-collaborating faulty nodes as well as lying nodes trying to compromise
the reputation system.
3. RDAS works under the assumption that any node in the network could be
compromised and does not require any trusted infrastructure.
4. RDAS is generic and applicable to any sensor network scheme based on data
aggregation.
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1.2 System Model and Background
We follow the system model of a static sensor network with nodes of identical
capacity. Every node is aware of its location and the location of all other nodes
relative to a common reference point. We assume the locations of nodes have been
estimated using any distributed self-localization protocol [9] [10] [4], and therefore
have some amount of natural error. Nodes will organize themselves into clusters
according to the Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [5] protocol
and report their sensor measurements to a cluster head at fixed intervals. Data
aggregation consists of the cluster head using the reported sensor measurements and
the appropriate sensor model to detect the occurrence and location of an event.





where zi is the received sensor measurement, a is the amplitude of the signal, x
is a 2-dimensional vector indicating the event position, ξi is a 2-dimensional vector
indicating the location of sensor node i, α is a known attenuation coefficient, w is the
additive white Gaussian noise and ‖x‖ gives the Euclidean norm of x. The model is
applicable to several sensor types, including acoustic and radiation sensors. For an
event of known amplitude nodes can estimate their distance to the event from their
sensor measurement. The model also assumes the nodes have the ability to determine
their own location. From this information the CH can estimate the location of the
event by performing error-resilient triangulation on the data reported by the cluster
nodes.
1.2.1 Failure model
We assume a failure model with increasing levels of sophistication within our
system model. Nodes can fail to report accurate data while performing cluster head
or cluster node tasks. Cluster nodes will fail when reporting to the cluster head,
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while cluster heads will do so while reporting to the base station. A legitimate node
will report the data that it senses and will commit errors within a specified bound
at a natural error rate. A faulty node will report incorrect sensor measurements with
the goal of altering the result of data fusion. The error in these measurements will
statistically be higher than that in the reports from legitimate nodes. The faulty
behavior can be colluding or non-colluding. A non-colluding faulty node randomly
sends incorrect information with no specific pattern, while a colluding faulty node is
partially aware of the system model and conspires with other faulty nodes in order
to cause greater damage by coordinating the value of their erroneous reports. One
example of this would be that they agree on a single location and report a sensed
value that corresponds to an event at that location.
In addition to data reporting failures, our system model is also vulnerable to
attacks on the reputation system. A bad-mouthing node will falsely accuse legitimate
nodes of incorrect behavior within the system, while a ballot- stuffing node will falsely
praise faulty nodes that are committing faults. Both kinds will be referred to as liar
nodes throughout this work. Furthermore, nodes which exhibit both faulty and liar
behavior will be referred to as malicious nodes.
1.2.2 The LEACH data aggregation protocol
LEACH is a distributed protocol architecture that provides energy-efficient rout-
ing and data aggregation by organizing nodes into a hierarchy. The protocol consists
of a series of phases in which nodes rotate routing and data aggregation activities for
fixed periods of time called rounds. The first phase is the advertisement phase where
nodes are assigned a probability of becoming a cluster head during the given round
depending on how many times they have been cluster head before. Communication
among cluster nodes and cluster head will be one-hop, therefore nodes that become a
cluster head broadcast an advertisement which the rest of the nodes use to determine
which cluster to join. The next phase is the cluster set-up phase, where nodes that re-
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ceive competing cluster head advertisements affiliate themselves with a single cluster
head, based on the strength of its received signal. The cluster head then proceeds to
create a TDMA schedule telling its nodes when to send their data, in this way saving
energy by avoiding collisions and retransmissions. Once clusters and their schedules
are created, the data aggregation phase can proceed. Whenever nodes have data to
send, they send it during their allocated transmission time. Otherwise they can turn
off their radio and save energy. When a round is over a new set of cluster heads
is elected. The cluster head election mechanism makes sure that all nodes perform
cluster head duties on an equal basis in an attempt to distribute the energy required
for data aggregation and transmission to the base station evenly across the network.
1.2.3 Event localization
Different ways to perform event localization efficiently and accurately have been
studied before, but in this work we use the general framework presented in [11].
Following the previously specified sensor model in equation 1.1, we assume there is





and we can rewrite is as,
‖x2‖ + ‖ξi‖
2 − 2xT ξi =
a
zi
, i = 1, 2, 3... (1.3)
We want to solve this system of quadratic equations for the unknown event location
x. We generate a system of linear equations by subtracting the first equation (i = 1)











So given K sensors, we obtain K − 1 linear equations which we can express in the
matrix form Ax = b, where A is the matrix of the coefficients of vector x and b
is the vector of right-hand sides. We therefore need at least three sensors to locate
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an event in 2-dimensional space. When there are more than 3 sensors available,
it becomes an over-determined problem. A common method of dealing with such
systems is least-squares fitting, a method of linear regression which minimizes the
error between the observed values which compose the system of equations and the
predicted values which form the least-squares fitting solution. The least-squares fit
of the event location is given by:
x̂ = (ATA)−1ATb (1.5)
The result x̂ provides an estimate of the event location which minimizes the
squared error of the system of equations (as given by Equation 1.6):
E2 = ‖Ax̂− b‖2 (1.6)
The solution for other values of the power α (α = 2 in the discussion so far) differs
from the one presented here. For higher integer values of α the equations would be
polynomials of degree higher than 2. To linearize such a system using this approach
would require substracting one equation from the rest until all terms of power higher
than one are eliminated. An algorithm for solving systems of polynomial equations
is discussed in [12].
1.2.4 Assumptions
Our sensor network model assumes that all nodes are of identical capacity and can
become compromised at any moment. However, the process of compromising a node
requires expenditure of non-zero amount of resources, including time. Therefore, at
the time of deployment, there exists no compromised internal node and the network
becomes compromised with a certain finite rate. There is no assumption about all
the nodes being deployed at the same time. We assume the nodes will use some basic
cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate their identity and prevent Sybil attacks.
Our environment model assumes events of known amplitude can occur at any point
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within the area of the network. The events are sensed by nodes within a limited
distance radius in two dimensions and following the sensor model presented in Section
1.2. In order for a cluster head to perform event localization it must know the location
of sensing nodes, so it is assumed a node localization algorithm has been executed
before event localization begins and has resulted in node locations being estimated
with normal error. Much work has gone into the area of node localization for sensor
networks, both in secure environments [13] and insecure environments [14]. The
existing work can be used to meet this assumption. In this thesis we deal with
localization of single events at a time and not multiple concurrent events. In other




Data aggregation is a fundamental and important problem in wireless sensor net-
works. Previous studies have proved that substantial energy savings are not only
possible but essential for the success of wireless sensor networks [15]. A wide va-
riety of solutions have been proposed to perform resilient data aggregation in the
presence of adversaries. Most of these solutions consist of cryptographic mechanisms
developed under the assumption of a specific topology scenario. Although reputation
frameworks for sensor network monitoring have been proposed, we are not aware of
any previous work that has a applied a reputation-based approach to performing ro-
bust data aggregation. In this section we detail some of the prior research in these
topics.
2.1 Techniques for Data Aggregation and Event Localization
Several data aggregation mechanisms have become popular among sensor net-
work researchers including directed difussion [16], LEACH [5], greedy aggregation [17]
and Cougar [18]. These protocols organize nodes into hierarchies and perform data-
centric routing, which has demonstrated substantial energy savings over end-to-end
routing schemes. Other data aggregation work deals with finding the best ways of
aggregating data within the network. For example, the authors of [19] present sev-
eral algorithms for spatial aggregation of sensor data, taking into consideration the
non-uniform placement of nodes in the sensed area. In [9], the authors present an
algorithm for probabilistic event localization for cases where node positioning makes
events hard to locate. The main deficiency of these protocols is that they assume
a trusted environment. Research on robust data aggregation deals with maintaining
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the accuracy of aggregation while assuming that nodes can drop and modify data in
arbitrarily intelligent and unpredictable ways.
The authors in [20] describe a cryptographic solution to prevent an intruder from
introducing compromised nodes into the network. The protocol uses end-to-end au-
thentication between sensor nodes and the base station along with time delayed ag-
gregation. The problem with cryptographic solutions is that they depend on the
protection of cryptographic keys, which if somehow compromised would allow an
intruder to participate in network activities. A variety of approaches have been pro-
posed which complement cryptography and help minimize the effect of adversaries
with cryptographic keys. In [3], the authors present an approach which combines
random sampling with interactive proofs to approximate true sensor values when
the aggregator and a fraction of the sensor nodes are compromised. Their approach
focuses mainly on combating compromised aggregators and assumes only a small
fraction of sensor nodes are corrupted. [21] details an energy-efficient method of in-
corporating cluster head and cluster node monitoring into the LEACH protocol. [22]
presents a probabilistic approach that uses the message routing layer to confirm and
filter out false event data being forwarded to a base station.
2.2 Reputation Systems in Sensor Networks
Reputation systems are becoming increasingly popular to diminish the influence
of malicious users in Internet communities. Websites which rely on user-generated
content, such as recommendation sites or online auction systems, depend on user-
generated opinions about other users to maintain the reliability of their service. The
effectiveness of reputation systems stems from the fact that its users are capable of
accurately judging the behavior of users with which they interact and this information
is made available to everyone. Therefore users can select better content or service as
a result of the past experience of others. Obtaining the same results in the sensor
network scenario depends nodes being able to perform these tasks similarly. When
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applied to data aggregation, nodes must be able to rate the accuracy of the data
reported by other nodes based on their own measurements and those of neighboring
nodes. The reputation system must also provide a way of distributing the reputations
of nodes throughout the network in an efficient and useful manner.
Formal approaches to designing reputation systems have been presented in the
past, mostly to deal with reputation in e-commerce scenarios [23]. The authors of [6]
adapt one of these approaches to design a general framework for maintaining repu-
tation in the distributed scenario of wireless sensor networks. [7], the authors tackle
the problem of false reputation reports by introducing the use of trust to maintain a
node’s behavior in the reputation system. In [24], the authors proposed a trust index
to measure the performance of nodes in reporting and locating events. They focus
only on binary events and assume nodes are capable of individually reporting event
locations instead of just a distance to the event radius. In [25], the authors use a
reputation system to detect and exclude malicious beacon nodes from being used in
sensor location discovery.
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3. REPUTATION-BASED RESILIENT EVENT
LOCALIZATION
The goal of our system is to reliably and efficiently determine the location of an
event given sensor measurements in the presence of legitimate, faulty and malicious
nodes. Our design is centered on using the LEACH protocol coupled with a reputation
system in order to perform robust and accurate data aggregation. It can be split into
two separate yet tightly coupled components: (1) the reputation system and (2)
the data aggregation protocol. The design of the reputation system is focused on
accurately quantifying the legitimate (or faulty) behavior of nodes with respect to
the desired operation, while the design of the data aggregation protocol is focused
on maintaining reliable, accurate and efficient event localization in the presence of
adversaries by using the reputation system.
3.1 Reputation System
The design of a reputation system consists of two fundamental parts. The first
part is the reputation engine, which provides a way of representing reputation ratings
by computing a value from various behaviors of a user in the system. Input for repu-
tation engines includes direct observations as well as feedback from other users. The
computing of reputation can range from simple addition of inputs to more compli-
cated mathematical formulae. The second part is the propagation mechanism, which
is the way reputation is stored and obtained by users in the system. In a decentralized
approach users would maintain reputation values independently and share and use
them according to the current protocol.
The reputation engine adopted for our design is called the beta reputation sys-
tem [23]. The beta reputation system has the advantages of having a firm basis on
17
the theory of statistics and being intuitive in its application. The beta probability
distribution is used to describe the posteriori probability of a binary event based on
past observed outcomes of the event. Its probability density function can be described




pα−1(1 − p)β−1 (3.1)
We follow a Bayesian framework using the beta distribution for representing repu-
tation in the sensor network. The way to do this is by considering a node’s actions to
be binary events with the possible outcomes of being correct or erroneous. Our goal
is then to estimate the probability that the behavior of the node for the next event
is correct. Node i believes that node j will behave correctly with probability θ. The
outcome is independently drawn from observation to observation and θ is different
for every node j. Since parameter θ is unknown, node i models this uncertainty by
assuming θ is drawn from a beta distribution that is updated as new observations
are made. We use the Beta(α, β) distribution to estimate θ, where α and β repre-
sent the count of correct and erroneous actions observed respectively. At the start of
the system, without prior knowledge, the initial estimate of θ should correspond to
a uniform distribution on [0,1], or equivalently Beta(1,1). As more observations are
made, the beta probability density function asymptotically approximates a Dirac at
θ. We define the reputation rating Ri,j that node i has about node j as the expected
value of the beta distribution parameterized as follows
Ri,j = E(Beta(α + 1, β + 1)) =
α + 1
α + β + 2
(3.2)
Equation 3.2 shows that the expected value of the beta distribution is simply the
fraction of events that have had outcome α. Therefore reputation is given by the ratio
of cooperative actions to total actions observed about a node. This decision is intuitive
and justifies the use of the beta distribution. Using the uniform distribution as the
starting point yields an initial reputation for all nodes of 0.5 when no observations
have been made (α = 0, β = 0). This describes the lack of knowledge about a node’s
behavior and indicates that any outcome is equally likely.
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3.1.1 Representing reputation and trust
Within the context of a network of distributed sensor nodes, every node will
maintain its own reputation ratings for all other nodes with which it interacts. It is
also reasonable to assume that nodes can behave arbitrarily in performing different
tasks. For example, a node can act correctly while reporting data to its cluster
head but can shift the outcome of aggregation when performing cluster head duties.
Reputation then must depend on the activity being observed, so it is represented by
a vector Ri,j < q1, ..., qn > with a dimension for each of n different tasks node i is
observing node j perform.
As in social relationships, reputation in sensor networks is built from two sources
of information: (1) evaluation of the actions that are directly observed when mon-
itoring other nodes, called first-hand information in this work, and (2) information
obtained from other nodes about the observed node’s actions, referred to as second-
hand information. Second-hand information is desirable in order to confirm first-hand
information and to update reputation faster, since nodes may only have fleeting in-
teraction with some nodes, but it makes the system vulnerable to bad-mouthing and
ballot-stuffing attacks.
There are several approaches to deal with liar nodes. The simplest solution is
to only use first-hand information to create reputation. But this approach ends up
creating many disjoint reputation systems where nodes will take a long time to detect
malicious nodes. Another approach is to assign less weight to second-hand informa-
tion based on the reputation of the reporting node. Nodes with a bad reputation will
then have less influence on altering reputation. This approach works only under the
assumption that nodes that lie in their reputation reports will also behave badly in
regular sensor network activities and hence have a low reputation. In [7], Buchegger
and Le Boudec get rid of this assumption by separately keeping track of nodes’ ac-
curacy in reporting on the behavior of other nodes and representing it in what they
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call a trust rating. The trust Ti,j that node i has in node j is described by using the
beta distribution
Ti,j = E(Beta(γ + 1, δ + 1)) =
γ + 1
γ + δ + 2
(3.3)
where parameters γ, δ represent good and bad actions, respectively, in reporting
node behavior. The trust rating can be used to decrease the influence of liar nodes
in the reputation system by ignoring second-hand reports from nodes with Ti,j lower
than a given threshold.
3.1.2 Calculating reputation and trust
For a node i, RDAS calculates α, β as follows. Node i interacts with node j for
some ∆t and records ri,j cooperative events and si,j non-cooperative events. It also
receives a report from a set N of neighbor nodes with their own observations . These
will all be aggregated as follows









where u < 1 is an aging factor that allows reputation to fade with time. The last
term incorporates second-hand information to the reputation calculation. The prob-
lem of how to combine first-hand and second-hand information into a single reputation
measure was tackled in [23] by mapping it to a similar problem in Dempster-Shafer
belief theory, and was adapted to reputation in sensor networks in [6]. Their approach
used the reporting node k’s reputation rating to weight down its contribution to the
reputation of j. We adopt their solution with the modification of using the trust
rating of k to weight down its second-hand report. The D(rk,j) belief discounting









This function gives greater weight to nodes with high trust and never gives a weight
above 1, therefore second-hand information will never outweigh first-hand informa-
tion. If γi,k = 0 the function will return 0, therefore node k’s report will not affect the
reputation update. The relationship between trust and weight is not linear, as the
weight value is slightly less than trust value. For details on Dempster-Shafer belief
discounting refer to [23] and [26].
In order to update the trust rating, a node i receiving a reputation report from
node k about node j compares this report to its own reputation rating for node j. If
the difference exceeds a threshold then node i lowers its trust rating for node k. Let





1, |Ri,j − E((Beta(rk,j, sk,j))| < d
0, |Ri,j − E((Beta(rk,j, sk,j))| ≥ d
(3.6)
where d is a positive constant for the deviation threshold. So after the deviation
test, we update our trust:
γ := vγ + a
δ := vδ + (1 − a)
(3.7)
where v < 1 is the aging factor for trust fading. The idea behind this approach
is that a node k that is lying about some node j in its reports will see its trust
rating reduced, since under the assumption that a majority of the nodes are correctly
reporting the behavior of node j, Ri,j will be different to the reports from node k. If
node j’s behavior is changing, then the trust of node k will suffer initially, but will
go back up when its reports are confirmed by other neighbors of node i and i itself.
3.1.3 Confidence in reputation ratings
Under the presented scheme, reputation ratings are generated regardless of the
amount of observations gathered. This may cause some reputation ratings to be more
accurate than others. For example, a node that has been observed through 100 events
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and that behaves cooperatively for 50 of those events will have a reputation close to
0.5, while a node for whom no actions have been observed will also have a reputation
of 0.5. The first node’s reputation rating would then have a higher significance than
the second node’s reputation rating, since we really have no knowledge of how the
second node will behave but have greater certainty that the first node will behave
cooperatively around 50% of the time. This idea can be referred to as the confidence
in a reputation rating. Intuitively, it can be said that the more observations that
have been gathered about a node the higher the confidence on its reputation rating
should be. Confidence should therefore be a function of α and β.
Different applications may choose to use confidence in different ways. For exam-
ple, when choosing a node with which to interact from a set of nodes with equally
high reputations, a node can pick the node with the highest confidence. Confidence
can be applied in RDAS by choosing a variable number of nodes to perform data
aggregation on every round. The number of nodes would be decided by the requisite
number needed to satisfy some threshold for the combination of the reputation and
the confidence, such as the sum of the reputation and confidence values of the nodes
should exceed a constant.
3.1.4 Generating reputation
A critical decision in the design of a reputation system is how to generate rep-
utation. In order to accurately quantify reputation we must be able to distinguish
between malicious behavior and natural errors in the sensor network. Under the
natural assumption that the majority of the nodes in the network will not be com-
promised, majority voting seems to be the most natural way to distinguish between
correct and incorrect data. However, as the nodes are located at different distances
from the event, their sensed values will be different. RDAS introduces the use of
cluster heads to generate reputation during the data aggregation phase. Every node
within a cluster sends their sensed data to the cluster head at fixed time intervals.
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In order to obtain a reliable indication of how accurate a sensor’s data is, the clus-
ter head uses the result of data aggregation to determine how data from one node
compares to the data reported by the rest of the cluster nodes.
Data aggregation in our system model consists of the detection and localization
of events. After the initial cluster formation, nodes are assigned a time slot for
data transmission to the cluster head. If a node sensed an event since the last data
transmission cycle, it transmits the sensed value at its allocated time slot. At the end
of data transmission the cluster head determines that an event occurred by considering
the nodes that reported sensed values and weighting a node’s report (or silence) by its
reputation value. If the cluster head determines an event occurred then it estimates
the location of the event using redundant data obtained from the cluster nodes and
calculates what sensor value should have been reported by every individual node.
This value can be compared to the actual value the sensor node reported in order to
determine the accuracy of the report. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
In order to measure the accuracy of an individual node’s report, the cluster head
uses Equation 1.2 and solves for zi in order to determine the expected sensor mea-
surement for node i. By analyzing the individual error of each node the cluster head
can determine which nodes’ measurements fall within the expected error range and
which deviate from that range. Error ranges for individual nodes will depend on many
variables including sensor type, event type and distance to the event. The following









1, Xi − µ ≤ kσ
0, otherwise
(3.9)
where ẑi is the sensor measurement estimate obtained from using x̂ in Equation
1.2, µ and σ are the average and standard deviation, respectively, of Xi across all
cluster nodes. Equation 3.9 applies the one-sided Chebyshev’s inequality (also known
as Cantelli’s Inequality) by treating Xi as a random variable with mean µ and by
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setting a parameter k such that the probability that a cooperative node’s sensor
measurement is greater than kσ is less than or equal to 1
1+k2
.
Setting a to 0 denotes the conclusion the activity is erroneous.
The rationale for this is that legitimate nodes will have on average a similar error
range in their sensing. Therefore nodes whose error is considerably larger than the
average error range will be deemed faulty. Note that a sensor model different from
the one in Equation 1.2 could be used. Using the cluster’s error statistics to rate
individual nodes’ error makes the system independent of the sensing model in use.
If an event was detected and a node did not report any data then the cluster head
calculates the distance between the node and the event and compares it to the sensing
range of the node’s sensor. If the distance is less than the sensing range by a fixed
tolerance the cluster head sets a = 0, otherwise a = 1. Similarly, if an event was not
detected, the cluster head sets a = 0 to nodes which reported data, and a = 1 to
those who did not. Reputation reports are then generated as follows
ri := uri + a
si := usi + (1 − a)
(3.10)
where ri and si are the number of cooperative and non-cooperative events, respec-
tively, observed about node i during a given period of time. This calculation is being
done at the CH. So the CH is updating the reputation scores of all the other nodes
in the cluster. The CH sends the tuple (ri, si) for each node in a broadcast to all
the nodes in the cluster. Cluster nodes will update their reputation and trust ratings
using this report as explained in Section 3.1.2.
3.2 Data Aggregation
As explained in our fault model, LEACH is vulnerable to attacks from cluster
nodes reporting data to the cluster head as well as cluster heads reporting data
to the base station. Compromised nodes can alter the result of data aggregation
by arbitrarily or strategically sending erroneous data to the cluster head. Malicious
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Fig. 3.1. Reputation generation during data aggregation
cluster heads can also alter the result of the data aggregation sent to the base station.
The second aspect of our system design deals with the effective use of reputation in
order to increase the reliability of data aggregation.
3.2.1 Resilient Event Localization
Cluster formation is an initial step in the network. Then, once an event occurs,
every node sends its sensor measurement to the cluster head. The cluster head will use
the sensor measurements to perform event detection and localization as explained in
the previous section. The cluster head determines if an event has occurred by using
majority voting among the cluster nodes. In order to prevent faulty nodes from
shifting the result of the voting, RDAS uses weighted voting to reduce the influence
of nodes with low reputation. For a cluster C, every node j that reports sensor data
submits a vote ej = 1, and every node j that does not report data submits a vote















1, EventV otes > NoEventV otes
0, otherwise
(3.11)
where Event = 1 represents that an event has been detected.
There are several approaches possible to mitigating the effects of faulty nodes
in event localization. The goal is to eliminate the contribution of faulty nodes as
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The cluster head can apply reputation filtering, which simply
consists of eliminating nodes whose reputation drops below a filtering threshold (FT )
from the event localization aggregation. This is the method used in the simulations
presented here, since our fault model consists of nodes that try to severely shift result
of data aggregation. A more fine-tunable approach for other scenarios, which we call
reputation weighting, is to apply weighted least-squares fitting using a function of
the nodes’ reputation rating as the weight for each equation. Weighted least-squares
fitting gives priority to minimizing the error of equations with a greater weight. Nodes
with a higher reputation can then have more influence on event localization than those
with a lower reputation. The equation for resilient event localization using reputation
weighting is
x̂ = (ATWA)−1ATWb (3.12)
W = diag{f(Ri,2), f(Ri,3), ..., f(Ri,j)} ∀ j ∈ C (3.13)





1, R ≥ FT
0, R < FT
(3.14)
As an example, we apply our approach to the scenario depicted in Figure 3.2. If
an event occurs at location (20,20), and nodes positioned at locations ξ1 = (30,25),
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ξ2 = (10,22), ξ3 = (25,10) and ξ4 = (5,5) should report according to our sensor model
the values z1 = 8, z2 = 9.62, z3 = 8, and z4 = 2.22, respective. Assuming nodes 1,
2 and 3 are legitimate and report values with natural error and node 4 is faulty and
reports a very different value, we assign z1 = 7.8, z2 = 9.2, z3 = 7.7, and z4 = 20. If
we perform redundant event triangulation solving Equation 1.5 we obtain an event
estimate of x̂ = (17.59, 16.08), which has an error of 4.6. Assuming that reputation
generation has succeeded and the reputation rating of node 4 is below the reputation
filtering threshold, we solve Equation 3.12 setting the weight of nodes 1, 2, 3 to 1 and
the weight of node 4 to 0 in the diagonal matrix W, which corresponds to entering
Equation 3.14 into Equation 3.13. This yields an event estimate of x̂ = (20.03, 20.05),
which has an error of 0.06.
Fig. 3.2. Resilient Event Localization
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3.2.2 Cluster head election and monitoring
So far all reputation generation and propagation has been performed by the cluster
head. Cluster heads receive data from the cluster nodes, determine the appropriate
reputation ratings for each node and send reputation reports back to the nodes. Thus,
there is nothing to prevent the cluster head from performing malicious activities.
Nodes can simply wait until they become cluster head to attempt to sabotage network
activities. An unmonitored cluster head can omit sending the event location or send
false data to the base station, and can send false reputation reports about nodes in
its cluster. The trust rating explained as part of the reputation system is intended
to mitigate the false reputation attacks. An intuitive solution to prevent false data
aggregation reports to the base station would be to have multiple cluster heads per
cluster which would allow the base station to use majority voting to select the correct
aggregation. Instead, we propose the use of cluster monitors which would perform
the same data aggregation as the cluster head, but instead of sending a high-energy
transmission to the base station, they will overhear the cluster head’s report to the
base station, compare it with the result of their own aggregation and generate a
reputation report about the cluster head. A reputation rating about cluster head
behavior will be kept as a dimension of the reputation vector, since it can be assumed
that nodes could behave correctly as sensing nodes and maliciously as cluster heads.
In our approach, nodes in a round will become cluster monitors with a probability
that is twice than that of becoming a cluster head, so there will be on the average
two cluster monitors per cluster. In the first communication phase of the LEACH
protocol, the cluster heads broadcast an advertisement and the nodes join the cluster
with the highest received signal strength. Our algorithm changes the cluster election
criteria in order to mitigate the effect of malicious cluster heads. Cluster monitors
choose a cluster head first and send their own advertisement. The signal strength
of one cluster will now be the minimum signal strength among the cluster head’s
and cluster monitors’ advertisements, and again the nodes will choose the maximum
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signal strength cluster. The nodes will also discard advertisements from cluster heads
whose reputation is below a specified threshold.
Cluster monitors will overhear data transmissions from the nodes to the cluster
head and perform data aggregation. They will compare their aggregation with the
report the cluster head sends to the base station, and generate a reputation report











1, ‖x̂i − x̂j‖ ≥ AggThr
0, otherwise
(3.15)
Where x̂i, x̂j is the estimated event location by nodes i and j respectively. Cluster
monitors will generate reputation reports about regular cluster nodes in the same
fashion as the cluster heads. This makes them serve a second purpose in accelerating
the propagation of reputation across the network. To ensure that these reports are not
forgeable can be solved through a cryptographic method such as digital signatures.
3.3 Experiments and Results
The data aggregation protocol was simulated using the TinyOS 2.0 Simulator
(TOSSIM) [8]. Nodes in the sensor network are placed in uniformly distributed
random locations within a square area. We assume every node has used a localization
algorithm to estimate the location of every other node in the network. This can be
done if only a fraction of the nodes in the network have access to positioning hardware
and other nodes participate in a distributed protocol to estimate their own locations.
Prior work has shown how the localization can be done in the presence of compromised
nodes [27] [10] [25], leveraging the fact that there is sufficient redundancy in the
network. We simulate the fact that the estimate is inaccurate by making each node
add a normally distributed random error to the location of every node. An event of
fixed amplitude is generated at fixed intervals at a different random location. Every
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experiment was run with the same set of events to allow an even comparison. Nodes
that are within sensing range of the event detect its occurrence during their sensing
period and report the sensed value following the data aggregation protocol. The
compromised nodes in the network perform some of the faulty actions detailed in




Area of sensor field 300m by 300m
Node transmission range 100 m
# Nodes 50
# Clusters ∼ 3





Filtering Threshold (FT ) 0.5
Aging Factor 0.99
Trust Deviation Threshold 0.3
In order to assess both the performance and the applicability of our approach,
we are interested in separately measuring the propagation of reputation across the
network over time and the accuracy of reputation-based data aggregation. The ac-
curacy of data aggregation is quantified by the distance between the event location
estimate at the cluster heads and the actual location of the event. The metric we
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are specifically interested in for the evaluation of RDAS is the improvement in event
localization compared to the baseline data aggregation without any reputation or
trust. We call this metric the accuracy of our system, defined as:
Accuracy = 1 −
Localization error using RDAS
Localization error using baseline
(3.16)
In order to compute the accuracy of RDAS, in every experiment the cluster heads
performed two separate event localization computations, one using reputation and
the other ignoring reputation ratings. The accuracy was computed for every individ-
ual cluster head data aggregation throughout the simulations. Since the reputation
of sensing nodes is updated as time goes by, the accuracy of the data aggregation
also changes over time. Accuracy is plotted against events rather than time, since
reputation and trust are updated only when events occur. Experiments were repeated
10 times to obtain low confidence intervals.
We perform four experiments.
1. In Experiment 1 we show the accuracy improvement with RDAS in the presence
of increasing percentage of faulty nodes, which are in successive experiments non-
colluding and colluding. We analyze the effects of increasing compromise rates on the
breaking point of the system.
2. In Experiment 2, nodes increasingly become both faulty and liar nodes. These will
be referred to as malicious nodes. In successive experiments, the malicious nodes are
non-colluding and colluding. We show the variation of the reputation and the trust
values and the localization error. This experiment allows us to assess the protocols
resiliency against attacks on the reputation system. 3. In Experiment 3 we assume
a fraction of the system has been secured through alternative mechanisms and can-
not be compromised. We show the accuracy of the system as the network becomes
compromised up to a fixed percentage and how the effect of the compromised nodes
becomes negligible over time.
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3.3.1 Experiment 1 - Effect of Faulty Nodes
In Experiment 1, we linearly increase the percentage of compromised nodes in
increments of 6%, starting at zero and increasing up to 72%. After more than 72%
the results become too unstable to be useful. In this experiment compromised nodes
will be faulty, meaning they will report erroneous sensor measurements. For part (a),
the faulty nodes are non-colluding and add a uniform random number to their sensed
data values. For part (b), the faulty nodes are colluding and report data corresponding
to an event location which they have previously coordinated and which is different
from the actual event’s location. This false event location is fixed throughout the
simulations and therefore its distance to the real event will always be random. It can
be assumed that in a real world scenario nodes must be compromised at some finite
rate, so we repeated the experiment for different rates.
Experiment 1(a) - Non-colluding faulty nodes
Figure 3.3(b) shows the accuracy of the system as the network gets compromised at
two different rates of 6% every 400 and 6% every 800 events. Each marker in the plots
indicates the point at which an additional 6% of the network became compromised.
Figure 3.3(c) zooms in on the first 4000 events. It is interesting to observe that
during the first 400 events, when no nodes are compromised, the accuracy drops
below 0. This is due to the fact that node’s starting reputation ratings are exactly
at the threshold of 0.5 for elimination from data aggregation. Since some nodes will
inevitably have their reputation reduced due to natural errors, their data will not be
used for event localization, yielding for a transient period a less accurate result than
the baseline case.
After the first nodes become compromised the localization error of the both the
baseline and RDAS systems increases equivalently, but as compromised nodes start
gathering bad reputation the error of RDAS becomes less than that of the baseline
system and the accuracy of the system increases with each passing event. When pre-
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viously legitimate nodes become compromised, the accuracy of the system drops for
a short period since these nodes have built high reputation ratings before becoming
compromised and their faulty data will be aggregated by cluster heads. This explains
the oscillating pattern of the accuracy plots immediately after additional nodes be-
come compromised. The two different rates indicate that the faster the network gets
compromised the harder it is to maintain accuracy, since the nodes will have less time
to detect compromised nodes through the reputation mechanism. In order to reduce
the accuracy of RDAS an attacker would not only need to compromise a large number
of nodes, but must do so fast enough so their combined influence will prevent their
reputation decreasing relative to that of legitimate nodes. This point is illustrated in
Figure 3.3(b), where as the rate of compromise is suddenly dropped to 0 after the 72%
mark the system accuracy increases sharply. When the system with a 6% per 400
events compromise rate has 72% of its nodes compromised its accuracy is decreasing,
but with no more nodes getting compromised after this point its accuracy increases
sharply and quickly becomes better than the other system that is only 42% compro-
mised but is still getting compromised. The results indicate that even after 72% of
the network has been compromised the system is able to maintain high accuracy and
eliminate most of the false reports from non-colluding faulty nodes. Figure 3.3(a)
illustrates the localization error of both approaches and how RDAS makes its error
even lower once no more nodes are becoming compromised. This implies that RDAS
is only temporarily vulnerable when nodes become faulty, and with time is able to
eliminate their influence and maintain stable sensor network operation. RDAS always
performs better than the baseline case when any portion of the network is faulty, and
has similar performance when no nodes are faulty.
Experiment 1(b) - Colluding faulty nodes
The second part of Experiment 1 was done with the same rates of 6% per 400
events and 6% per 800 events, but with compromised nodes that collude in their
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(a) Localization error as network is compro-
mised with non-colluding faulty nodes at a rate
of 6% every 800 events













6% per 400 events
6% per 800 events
SC
SC
(b) Accuracy as network is compromised with
non-colluding faulty nodes














6% per 400 events
6% per 800 events
(c) Accuracy throughout first 4000 events for
non-colluding faulty nodes



















(d) Average reputation as network is compro-
mised with non-colluding faulty nodes at a rate
of 6% every 800 events
Fig. 3.3. Results as network is compromised with non-colluding faulty nodes.
misbehavior. The initial effect of colluding faulty nodes in the network is the same
as the effect of non-colluding faulty nodes. But since reputation is generated by
comparing data measurements among different nodes, as the number of colluding
faulty nodes per cluster increases they will obtain high reputation ratings and the
reputation of legitimate nodes will decrease.
Figure 3.4(b) shows how even after 54% of the network is compromised RDAS is
able to maintain the accuracy of the system steadily above 0 following a faulty node
injection. But after 60% of the network becomes compromised the accuracy slopes
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sharply down without recuperating. Since the faulty nodes are colluding, when faulty
nodes form a majority within a cluster the result of event localization will be closer
to their false event location than the real event location. Therefore the individual
sensing error of the faulty nodes will be less than the average and they will get good
reputation reports while the legitimate nodes get bad reputation reports. Eventually
the colluding nodes’ reputations will be higher than that of legitimate nodes and
RDAS will perform worse than the baseline system. Figure 3.4(a) and Figure 3.4(c)
and illustrate the crossover point where RDAS begins to perform worse than the
baseline system. But with 72% of the network compromised the error in the baseline
system is so large that both systems can be considered to be failing. In our last
experiment we are able to show that RDAS can perform successfully with a lower
percentage of colluding faulty nodes.
3.3.2 Experiment 2 - Effect of Malicious Nodes
For Experiment 2 we repeated the scenario in Experiment 1, but in this case the
compromised nodes are malicious nodes, meaning that they will report erroneous
sensing data, send good reputation reports about nodes they know are compromised
and send bad reputation reports about nodes that are legitimate. Again we repeated
the experiment for faulty nodes respectively being non-colluding and colluding.
Experiment 2(a) - Effect of non-colluding malicious nodes
As shown in Figure 3.5(b), RDAS still performs better than the baseline system
even as 72% of the network is compromised with malicious nodes (i.e., accuracy stays
above zero). By comparing the accuracy and reputation plots it can be observed
the accuracy is adversely affected by the reduced difference in reputation between
legitimate and compromised nodes. The addition of liar behavior reduces the gap
in reputation ratings among compromised and legitimate nodes and therefore the
accuracy of the system is less than with nodes that are just faulty.
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(a) Localization error as network is compro-
mised with colluding faulty nodes at a rate of
6% every 800 events













6% per 400 events
6% per 800 events
SC
SC
(b) Accuracy as network is compromised with
colluding faulty nodes



















(c) Average reputation as network is compro-
mised with colluding faulty nodes at a rate of
6% every 800 events
Fig. 3.4. Results as network is compromised with colluding faulty nodes.
Figure 3.5(c) shows the average reputation of legitimate and compromised nodes
separately as the network is compromised with non-colluding nodes at 6% per 800
events. To understand the spikes in the reputation plot of compromised nodes, con-
sider that the reputation of nodes immediately after they are compromised is much
higher than the rest of the compromised nodes.
In this and in the previous experiments, the reputation of legitimate nodes suffers
slight drops when nodes become compromised because the error in event localization
increases momentarily due to the high reputation rating of the recently compromised
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nodes. Figure 3.5(d) shows that initially with a small part of the network compro-
mised RDAS is able to identify liar nodes to reduce their influence on the reputation
system (since they have low trust values). The reputation of legitimate nodes there-
fore keeps increasing, up until 60% of the nodes become compromised. Beyond that,
the legitimate nodes’ reputation starts to drop and the malicious nodes’ reputation
starts to rise. This in turn causes the same effect on the trust ratings, since legitimate
reputation reports will deviate from current reputation ratings and vice versa with
reputation reports from liar nodes. This affects the system accuracy but not enough
to take it below 0, because the average reputations of legitimate and malicious nodes
never cross for non-colluding malicious nodes. This is because the sensed data values
they report never agree so they will never obtain good reputation reports from legit-
imate nodes, and the good reports they receive from liar nodes are heavily weighted
down by trust ratings.
Experiment 2(b) - Effect of colluding malicious nodes
Colluding nodes affect the accuracy of the system by shifting reputation ratings
in their favor as more nodes become compromised. Figure 3.6(b) and Figure 3.6(c)
show that as the network gets compromised with colluding malicious nodes the av-
erage reputation of the compromised nodes will begin to rise above the reputation of
legitimate nodes causing RDAS to perform worse than baseline. For both rates this
occurs after 54% of the network is compromised, so even with a little more than half
of the network compromised RDAS is still able to perform better than the baseline
system. Figure 3.6(d) shows that the average trust of liar nodes exceeds the average
trust of legitimate nodes after 66% of the network is compromised. The system is
therefore unable to identify and repress liar nodes after this point.
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(a) Localization error as network is compro-
mised with non-colluding malicious nodes at a
rate of 6% every 800 events
















6% per 400 events
6% per 800 events
SC
(b) Accuracy as network is compromised with
non-colluding malicious nodes



















(c) Average reputation as network is compro-
mised with non-colluding malicious nodes at a
rate of 6% every 800 events
















(d) Average trust as network is compromised
with non-colluding malicious nodes at a rate of
6% every 800 events
Fig. 3.5. Results as network is compromised with non-colluding malicious nodes.
3.3.3 Experiment 3 - Accuracy in a Partially Secured Network
In Experiment 3 we examine the case where the network gets compromised at a
constant rate until it reaches 30% and with all compromised nodes colluding. This
can correspond to a real world scenario where a sensor network has some nodes (70%
in this case) which have been secured through more sophisticated and possibly more
expensive mechanisms, such as physically tamper-proof hardware. This experiment
illustrates how RDAS allows for a significant amount of non- secure nodes to par-
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(a) Localization error as network is compro-
mised with colluding malicious nodes at a rate
of 6% every 800 events
















6% per 400 events
6% per 800 events
SC
(b) Accuracy as network is compromised with
colluding malicious nodes



















(c) Average reputation as network is compro-
mised with colluding malicious nodes at a rate
of 6% every 800 events
















(d) Average trust as network is compromised
with colluding malicious nodes at a rate of 6%
every 800 events
Fig. 3.6. Results as network is compromised with colluding malicious nodes.
ticipate in such a network without compromising the integrity of data aggregation.
Figure 3.7(b) shows the accuracy of event localization as nodes become compromised
with colluding malicious nodes up to 30%. If nodes continued to get compromised at
this rate the accuracy of the system would peak between 24% and 30% of the net-
work compromised as in previous experiments. But we can see that from this point
forward the accuracy starts improving linearly over time. Once nodes stop getting
compromised the reputation of the currently compromised nodes keeps decreasing
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across the network and the accuracy of the system improves. This can be explained
by the fact that the malicious nodes keep getting “outvoted” with successive events
and their reputations keep falling.





















(a) Localization error as network is compro-
mised with colluding malicious nodes at a rate
of 6% every 800 events up to 30%
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(b) Accuracy as network is compromised with
colluding malicious nodes up to 30%



















(c) Average reputation as network is compro-
mised with colluding malicious nodes at a rate
of 6% every 800 events up to 30%
















(d) Average trust as network is compromised
with colluding malicious nodes at a rate of 6%
every 800 events up to 30%
Fig. 3.7. Results as network is compromised with colluding malicious
nodes up to 30%.
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3.4 Analysis of Detection Probability
In this section we present an analytical estimate of the probability of detecting
faulty nodes as a function of their quantity and behavior. This analysis provides
insight into the effect of different kinds of faulty behavior on the effectiveness of the
reputation system. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that a node’s fault
model is described by a probabilistic distribution with parameters that can be varied
according to the specific model. The behavior under study here is the node’s accuracy
in reporting sensor measurements.
Given a set of nodes C that form a cluster, nodes within this set will form two
partitions M and M̄ , of nodes that are faulty and nodes that are legitimate, respec-
tively. Our goal is to classify a node’s behavior during a data aggregation round as
legitimate or faulty. This is achieved by computing the relative error Xi described
in equation 3.8 and using the deviation test in equation 3.9. The distribution of this
error will depend on the fault model of the given node. For any node in C we can
describe the probability density function of the error X using the theorem of total
probability:
fX(x) = mfX(x|M) + (1 − m)fX(x|M̄) (3.17)
where m is the probability that a node is faulty. Assume faulty nodes follow a distri-
bution with mean µM and variance σ
2
M , while legitimate nodes follow a distribution
with mean µM̄ and variance σ
2
M̄
. The expected value of X will then be given by:
E(X) = mµM + (1 − m)µM̄ (3.18)








. The expected value of X2 is given by:
E(X2) = m(µ2M + σ
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The variance of X is therefore:
V ar(X) = E(X2) − E2(X)
= m(µ2M + σ
2





−mµ2M − 2m(1 − m)µMµM̄ − (1 − m)
2µ2M̄
Given data measurements from a cluster, the probability that a node i’s measure-
ment will be classified as faulty is the probability that the error in the measurement
passes the deviation test in equation 3.9. We call this the probability of detection.
P (detection) = P (X ≥ σXk + µX) (3.21)
For i ∈ M we can calculate this probability using the conditional cumulative
density function FX(x|M).
P (detection) = 1 − FX(σXk + µX |M) (3.22)
For the case of non-colluding faulty nodes we can assume fX(x|M) will follow a
uniform distribution with non-zero mean and a large variance. For colluding faulty
nodes fX(x|M) should follow a normal distribution with non-zero mean and a small
variance. Figure 3.8 shows the probability for these two fault models as the fraction
of faulty nodes, namely m, increases. For this graph, the model used for legitimate
nodes is N(µM̄ = 0, σM̄ = 0.03). Non-colluding faulty nodes follow model U(2, 4)
which corresponds to µM = 3, σM = 0.57, while colluding faulty nodes follow model
N(µM = 3, σM = 0.03). The plot shows that for a low fraction of faulty nodes the
scheme should be able to detect faulty behavior with high probability for both fault
models. As the fraction of faulty nodes surpasses 30%, the detection of faulty behavior
becomes increasingly unlikely. For non-colluding faulty nodes, the uniformly random
noise added to their data measurements causes the probability of their detection to
drop gradually. For colluding faulty nodes, their coordinated data reports cause the
probability of detection to drop drastically when a large portion of the nodes are
compromised.
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In this analysis, we have implicitly assumed that the means and the variances of
the errors made by the legitimate nodes and the faulty nodes are each time-invariant
or stationary. In practice however, this may not be the case. It is possible that
as more nodes get compromised, the mean error of the legitimate nodes actually
increases. However, there is a pull in the opposite direction as well—as the network
functions over a longer period, the reputation ratings of the legitimate nodes may
increase thereby keeping the mean error lower.
This analysis can be taken to provide a worst case estimate of the performance of
RDAS. This is due to the fact that the analysis emulates the case where the entire
fraction of compromised nodes (given by the value on the x-axis) is introduced in
one go, starting with each faulty node having the same reputation rating as the
legitimate nodes. The network is then executed for an extended period of time and
asymptotically the output metrics (reputation or probability of detection) approach
the value given on the y-axis. In practice however, RDAS works in the case where
the entire fraction of nodes does not get compromised instantaneously but over time.
Thus the reputation ratings of the individual faulty nodes will be lower than that
of the legitimate nodes. Correspondingly the performance of RDAS will be better
than predicted by the analysis. For example, the results from experiment 1 show
that RDAS outperforms the baseline with 72% or 54% of the network compromised
respectively for non-colluding and colluding nodes. From the analysis, the value can
be read off as 30% for both cases.
Using this model, we can estimate the steady state reputation of a compromised
node as seen by a legitimate node after a fixed amount of aggregations. Reputation
is computed from parameters α and β, as described in equation 3.2. The value
over time of α and β depends on the detection of faulty behavior in each of the
aggregations. Every aggregation can be seen as a Bernoulli trial, with probability of
success pα = 1 − P (detection) for α and pβ = P (detection) for β. After n trials, the
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expected values are given by E(α) = npα and E(β) = npβ. The expected value of
reputation is then given by
E(Rep) =
npα + 1
npα + npβ + 2
=
n(1 − P (detection))
n(1 − P (detection)) + nP (detection) + 2
(3.23)
For the same scenario case of non-colluding and colluding faulty nodes illustrated in
Figure 3.8, the expected reputation is plotted in Figure 3.9.
























Fig. 3.8. Probability of Detection as Fraction of Faulty Nodes Increases
3.5 Resource Consumption Analysis
The resource consumtion overhead caused by RDAS is minimal, as will be shown
in the following analysis. The highest overhead is in data transmission, caused by
reputation reports from cluster heads to cluster nodes after aggregation. This report
contains a list of entries each consisting of a node identifier along with two integers
rk,j, sk,j representing legitimate and faulty actions during an aggregation round. The
number of entries in the report depends on the cluster size. Average cluster size is
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Fig. 3.9. Expected Reputation of Faulty Node as Fraction of Faulty
Nodes Increases
a function of the amount of clusters and network size. LEACH, however, takes the
percentage of nodes that are cluster heads at a time as a fixed parameter used in
the cluster head advertisement phase. The authors in [5] recommend that 5% of the
network is cluster head, which translates to an average cluster size of 20, regardless
of the size of the network. The size of a reputation report entry in bits depends on
the network size (N) and the number of actions performed by nodes per round (A) as
E = ⌈log2(N)⌉+ ⌈log2(A)⌉. Therefore, the average bandwidth for reputation reports
per aggregation round is BWrep = 20 ∗ (⌈log2(N)⌉ + ⌈log2(A)⌉).
The memory consumption overhead of RDAS is caused by the reputation and trust
information stored by each node. Reputation and trust tables consist of entries that
contain a node identifier and two integers, α, β for reputation or δ, γ for trust. The
total size of the tables in a node depends on the number of neighboring nodes that
will form part of the same clusters, A rough estimate of this value could be all nodes
that are within twice the transmission range of the node, since this is the maximum
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distance at which two nodes can form part of a single cluster, assuming that there
is a node exactly halfway between them which could serve as cluster head at some
point. For a transmission range R and network node density D, the average number
of nodes satisfying the above condition would be 4πR2D. Assuming entries of size S,
the memory consumption of reputation and trust tables would be MC = 4πR2∗D∗S.
For the case of a network with uniformly distributed nodes with density 0.0025 nodes
per m2 and transmission range of 100 m and 48 bits per table entry, the total memory
consumption would be MC = 6029 bits total for both reputation and trust tables.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The work in this thesis finds a way to increase the accuracy of data aggrega-
tion in wireless sensor networks in the presence of faulty and adversarial nodes. A
resilient data aggregation system was developed by coupling a popular data aggre-
gation scheme with a reputation system. The approach consists of maintaining rep-
utation ratings in order to detect nodes that report faulty data and prevent their
data from being aggregated. The design of this system consisted of mechanisms for
generating, propagating and using reputation in the context of event localization as
the aggregation computation.
Our work tackled problems in both the securing of data aggregation activities
as well as maintaining the reliability of the reputation system in the presence of
adversaries. In addition to false data reports, data aggregation is vulnerable to attacks
by compromised cluster heads. Our scheme handles such a case by proposing the
monitoring of cluster head activities along with reputation ratings in order to enable
nodes to avoid associating with suspicious cluster heads. Reputation systems are
vulnerable to attacks were nodes falsely report on the behavior of other nodes. Our
scheme applies techniques for rating the behavior of nodes in reputation reporting
and reduce the influence of liar nodes. Although applied here for event localization,
our scheme can be applied to a different aggregation scheme.
Simulations of our scheme measured the accuracy gains of using reputation fil-
tering under several attack scenarios of increasing complexity. Results demonstrated
that reputation systems are a feasible approach to improving the accuracy of event
localization in the presence of adversaries. Results show that for a network that is
becoming increasingly compromised our system is able to quickly detect nodes that
are reporting misleading data and eliminate their influence on event localization.
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For cases where even the majority of the network has been compromised with non-
colluding nodes that report randomly erroneous data, the system is able to eliminate
most of the localization error. Our system is also able to contain the influence of
compromised nodes which collude on their misbehavior and agree on a false event
location in their reports, as long as these compromised nodes. Results also show the
protocols resiliency against nodes that lie about other nodes performance in their
reputation reports.
As part of future development of this work, we plan to extend the scheme con-
sidering multi-hop routes from aggregator nodes to the base station and from the
sensing nodes to the aggregator node. These routes could add security concerns due
to the possibility of nodes dropping or modifying data en-route to the destination.
Possible solutions to this include using reputation to improve the selection of routes.
We intend to implement these schemes on a sensor network test-bed to verify their
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